| Leaders of the social movement had no way to know that FTX would collapse. But they also had every incentive to ignore warnings.  Photograph by Erika P. Rodriguez / NYT / Redux The implosion of Sam Bankman-Fried’s cryptocurrency exchange, FTX, and its connected trading firm, Alameda Research, prompted a scramble to account for billions in lost funds; sparked urgent demands for new regulation; and generated widespread Schadenfreude from those convinced that such crypto ventures are all surely too good to be true. But this was the rare financial scandal that had immediate significance in the world of philosophy, as Gideon Lewis-Kraus writes in a rigorous and thought-provoking piece. Bankman-Fried was the most prominent donor to a movement known as effective altruism, or E.A., which calls on its adherents to do good in the world in the most practical and rational ways possible—and his downfall, including reports of his lavish personal spending, has caused “raw anguish” within the E.A. community. Was Bankman-Fried’s connection to effective altruism simply a sham? Or, on the other hand, did his dedication to accumulating capital for the cause contribute to his seeming recklessness with other people’s money? And, on a bigger scale, what flaws inherent to E.A. has this scandal helped lay bare? Lewis-Kraus recently profiled one of the movement’s leaders, the Oxford philosopher William MacAskill—and in the wake of the FTX collapse, he follows up with MacAskill, other members of the E.A. community, and people who worked closely with Bankman-Fried to consider these questions and more. —Ian Crouch, newsletter editor Support The New Yorker’s award-winning journalism. Subscribe today » | 
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